Abstract
M. Yokoo et al. analyzed some weaknesses in McAfee’s double auction (MCD) protocol and proposed a robust threshold price double auction (TPD) protocol against false-name bids. Unfortunately, as their protocol strongly depends on the trust of auctioneer, the auctioneer’s misbehavior may fail an auction process. In addition, their scheme is in fact not robust in terms of comprehensive false bids. In this paper, we further investigate weaknesses in both MCD and TPD protocols, and then propose an improved double auction protocol against false bids. We also extend it for a practical and secure double auction implementation.
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Ha, J., Zhou, J., Moon, S. (2005). An Improved Double Auction Protocol Against False Bids. In: Katsikas, S., López, J., Pernul, G. (eds) Trust, Privacy, and Security in Digital Business. TrustBus 2005. Lecture Notes in Computer Science, vol 3592. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/11537878_28
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/11537878_28
Publisher Name: Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg
Print ISBN: 978-3-540-28224-2
Online ISBN: 978-3-540-31796-8
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