Abstract
Investigate how the level of rationality of power suppliers impacts on equilibrium. First fictitious play was established to electricity market. Then a leaning model Price-deviation-adjust (PD-adjust) was proposed, which inherits main characters of the fictitious play but in a lower rationality because of poor information. An interesting phenomenon is observed in numerical simulations: the errors coming from lower rationality of the agents can be reinforced and often bring the agents extra profits rather than loss, and eventually drive the market to enter an unstable state from the stable equilibrium one. The conclusion is a set of game models identified by a rationality variable should be introduced to understand the electricity market better.
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© 2005 Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg
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Zhou, X., Feng, L., Dong, X., Shang, J. (2005). Fictitious Play and Price-Deviation-Adjust Learning in Electricity Market. In: Wang, L., Chen, K., Ong, Y.S. (eds) Advances in Natural Computation. ICNC 2005. Lecture Notes in Computer Science, vol 3612. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/11539902_45
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/11539902_45
Publisher Name: Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg
Print ISBN: 978-3-540-28320-1
Online ISBN: 978-3-540-31863-7
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