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Foundations for Automated Trading — Its the Information That Matters

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Database and Expert Systems Applications (DEXA 2005)

Part of the book series: Lecture Notes in Computer Science ((LNISA,volume 3588))

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Abstract

Business relationships, and the sense of trust that they embody, provides an environment in which trade may be conducted with confidence. Trading involves the maintenance of effective relationships, and refers to the process of: need identification, partner selection, offer-exchange, contract negotiation, and contract execution. So we use the term in a sense that includes the business of e-procurement. Of particular interest are: the selection of trading partners, the development of trading relationships, and the negotiation and execution of contracts in the context of a relationship.

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Author information

Authors and Affiliations

  1. Faculty of IT, University of Technology, Sydney, Australia

    John Debenham

Authors
  1. John Debenham
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Editor information

Editors and Affiliations

  1. Copenhagen Business School, Centre for Applied ICT, 60 Howitzvej, 2000, Frederiksberg, DK

    Kim Viborg Andersen

  2. University Of Technology Sydney, NSW 2007, Australia

    John Debenham

  3. University of Linz, Altenbergerstraße 69, 4040, Linz, Austria

    Roland Wagner

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© 2005 Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg

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Debenham, J. (2005). Foundations for Automated Trading — Its the Information That Matters. In: Andersen, K.V., Debenham, J., Wagner, R. (eds) Database and Expert Systems Applications. DEXA 2005. Lecture Notes in Computer Science, vol 3588. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/11546924_52

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/11546924_52

  • Publisher Name: Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg

  • Print ISBN: 978-3-540-28566-3

  • Online ISBN: 978-3-540-31729-6

  • eBook Packages: Computer ScienceComputer Science (R0)

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