Abstract
The strong continuity thesis was introduced into the artificial life literature in 1994, [5], but since then has not received the attention and further development it merits. In this paper, I explain why if we are to identify genuine continuity between life and mind, a shift in perspective is needed from thinking about living and minded things and processes, to thinking about Life itself and Mind itself. I describe both life and mind as self-preserving processes and argue that this notion accounts for their purported continuity, drawing on research in embedded and embodied cognition to make my case. I then respond to Peter Godfrey-Smith’s observation that any view on which thought requires language is inconsistent with the strong continuity thesis by arguing that although such a view of thought might be rendered consistent with the thesis, a dynamic systems approach to cognition, i.e., one wherein thought is language-independent, is much more conducive to identifying genuine life-mind continuity.
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Stillwaggon, L. (2005). Toward Genuine Continuity of Life and Mind. In: Capcarrère, M.S., Freitas, A.A., Bentley, P.J., Johnson, C.G., Timmis, J. (eds) Advances in Artificial Life. ECAL 2005. Lecture Notes in Computer Science(), vol 3630. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/11553090_6
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/11553090_6
Publisher Name: Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg
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