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Emergence of Structure and Stability in the Prisoner’s Dilemma on Networks

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Advances in Artificial Life (ECAL 2005)

Part of the book series: Lecture Notes in Computer Science ((LNAI,volume 3630))

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Abstract

We study a population of individuals playing the prisoner’s dilemma game. Individual strategies are invariable but the network of relationships between players is allowed to change over time following simple rules based on the players’ degree of satisfaction. In the long run, cooperators tend to cluster together in order to maintain a high average payoff and to protect themselves from exploiting defectors. We investigated both synchronous and asynchronous network dynamics, observing that asynchronous update leads to more stable states, and is more tolerant to various kinds of perturbations in the system.

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Author information

Authors and Affiliations

  1. Information Systems Department, University of Lausanne, Switzerland

    Leslie Luthi, Mario Giacobini & Marco Tomassini

Authors
  1. Leslie Luthi
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  2. Mario Giacobini
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  3. Marco Tomassini
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Editor information

Editors and Affiliations

  1. Natural Computation Group, University of Kent, CT2 7NF, Canterbury, UK

    Mathieu S. Capcarrère

  2. Computing Laboratory and Centre for BioMedical Informatics, University of Kent, CT2 7NF, Canterbury, UK

    Alex A. Freitas

  3. Computer Science Department, University College London, London, UK

    Peter J. Bentley

  4. Computing Laboratory, University of Kent, Canterbury, UK

    Colin G. Johnson

  5. Department of Electronics, University of York, YO10 5DD, Heslington, York, UK

    Jon Timmis

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© 2005 Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg

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Luthi, L., Giacobini, M., Tomassini, M. (2005). Emergence of Structure and Stability in the Prisoner’s Dilemma on Networks. In: Capcarrère, M.S., Freitas, A.A., Bentley, P.J., Johnson, C.G., Timmis, J. (eds) Advances in Artificial Life. ECAL 2005. Lecture Notes in Computer Science(), vol 3630. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/11553090_67

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/11553090_67

  • Publisher Name: Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg

  • Print ISBN: 978-3-540-28848-0

  • Online ISBN: 978-3-540-31816-3

  • eBook Packages: Computer ScienceComputer Science (R0)

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