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Altruistic Punishment, Social Structure and the Enforcement of Social Norms

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Knowledge-Based Intelligent Information and Engineering Systems (KES 2005)

Part of the book series: Lecture Notes in Computer Science ((LNAI,volume 3683))

Abstract

In many social dilemmas, individuals are each better off acting in their own best interest. Social norms provide a mechanism by which group level order can emerge. Often the enforcement of a social norm requires some altruistic punishment. In this paper I explore the role of social structure in the emergence of group level order, in a variation of n-person Prisoners Dilemma played out on a network. The results from this study show that clustering plays an important role in the formation of cohesive groups.

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© 2005 Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg

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Newth, D. (2005). Altruistic Punishment, Social Structure and the Enforcement of Social Norms. In: Khosla, R., Howlett, R.J., Jain, L.C. (eds) Knowledge-Based Intelligent Information and Engineering Systems. KES 2005. Lecture Notes in Computer Science(), vol 3683. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/11553939_114

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/11553939_114

  • Publisher Name: Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg

  • Print ISBN: 978-3-540-28896-1

  • Online ISBN: 978-3-540-31990-0

  • eBook Packages: Computer ScienceComputer Science (R0)

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