Abstract
We present a Universally Composable (UC) time-stamping scheme based on universal one-way hash functions. The model we use contains an ideal auditing functionality, the task of which is to check that the rounds’ digests are correctly computed. Our scheme uses hash-trees and is just a slight modification of the known schemes of Haber-Stornetta and Benaloh-de Mare, but both the modifications and the audit functionality are crucial for provable security. We prove that our scheme is nearly optimal – in every UC time-stamping scheme, almost all time stamp requests must be communicated to the auditor.
This paper is an extended abstract. Proofs of the results are presented in the full version [8].
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Homepage of Surety, http://www.surety.com
Homepage of Authentidate, http://www.authentidate.com
Homepage of Digistamp, http://www.digistamp.com
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Buldas, A., Laud, P., Saarepera, M., Willemson, J. (2005). Universally Composable Time-Stamping Schemes with Audit. In: Zhou, J., Lopez, J., Deng, R.H., Bao, F. (eds) Information Security. ISC 2005. Lecture Notes in Computer Science, vol 3650. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/11556992_26
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/11556992_26
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