Abstract
David Chaum introduced Visual Voting scheme in which a voter obtains a paper receipt from a voting machine. This receipt can be used to verify that his vote was counted in the final tally, but cannot be used for vote selling. The Chaum’s system requires sophisticated printers and application of randomized partial checking (RPC) method.
We propose a complete design of a voting system that preserves advantages of the Chaum’s scheme, but eliminates the use of special printers and RPC.
Preview
Unable to display preview. Download preview PDF.
Similar content being viewed by others
References
Chaum, D.: Secret-Ballot Receipts and Transparent Integrity. Better and less-costly electronic voting and polling places
Chaum, D.: Untraceable Electronic Mail, Return Addresses, and Digital Pseudonyms. Communications of the ACM 24(2), 84–88 (1981)
Furukawa, J., Sako, K.: An Efficient Scheme for Proving a Shuffle. In: Kilian, J. (ed.) CRYPTO 2001. LNCS, vol. 2139, pp. 368–387. Springer, Heidelberg (2001)
Gomułkiewicz, M., Klonowski, M., Kutyłowski, M.: Rapid Mixing and Security of Chaum’s Visual Electronic Voting. In: Snekkenes, E., Gollmann, D. (eds.) ESORICS 2003. LNCS, vol. 2808, pp. 132–145. Springer, Heidelberg (2003)
Golle, P., Jakobsson, M., Juels, A., Syverson, P.: Universal Re-encryption for Mixnets. In: CTRSA 2004, pp. 163–178 (2004)
Jakobsson, M.: A Practical Mix. In: Nyberg, K. (ed.) EUROCRYPT 1998. LNCS, vol. 1403, pp. 448–461. Springer, Heidelberg (1998)
Jakobsson, M.: Flash Mixing. In: ACM Symposium on Principles of Distributed Computing 1999, pp. 83–89 (1999)
Jakobsson, M., Juels, A., Rivest, R.L.: Making Mix Nets Robust For Electronic Voting By Randomized Partial Checking. In: USENIX Security Symposium 2002, pp. 339–353 (2002)
Gomułkiewicz, M., Klonowski, M., Kutyłowski, M.: Onion Routing Based On Universal Re–Encryption Immune Against Repetitive Attack. In: Lim, C.H., Yung, M. (eds.) WISA 2004. LNCS, vol. 3325, pp. 400–410. Springer, Heidelberg (2005)
Mitomo, M., Kurosawa, K.: Attack for Flash MIX. In: Okamoto, T. (ed.) ASIACRYPT 2000. LNCS, vol. 1976, pp. 192–204. Springer, Heidelberg (2000)
McGaley, M.: Report on DIMACS Workshop on Electronic Voting - Theory and Practice, http://dimacs.rutgers.edu/SpecialYears/2003CSIP/reports.html
Neff, C.A.: A Verifiable Secret Shuffle and its Application to E-Voting. In: ACM Conference on Computer and Communications Security 2001, pp. 116–125 (2001)
Rivest, L.R.: Voting Resources Page, http://theory.lcs.mit.edu/~rivest/voting/
Schnorr, C.P.: Efficient Signature Generation by Smart Cards. Journal of Cryptology 4, 161–174 (1991)
Van de Graaf, J.: Adapting Chaum’s Voter-Verifiable election scheme to the Brazilian system, http://www.ppgia.pucpr.br/~maziero/pesquisa/wseg/2004/
Author information
Authors and Affiliations
Editor information
Editors and Affiliations
Rights and permissions
Copyright information
© 2005 Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg
About this paper
Cite this paper
Klonowski, M., Kutyłowski, M., Lauks, A., Zagórski, F. (2005). A Practical Voting Scheme with Receipts. In: Zhou, J., Lopez, J., Deng, R.H., Bao, F. (eds) Information Security. ISC 2005. Lecture Notes in Computer Science, vol 3650. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/11556992_36
Download citation
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/11556992_36
Publisher Name: Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg
Print ISBN: 978-3-540-29001-8
Online ISBN: 978-3-540-31930-6
eBook Packages: Computer ScienceComputer Science (R0)