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Virtual Games: A New Approach to Implementation of Social Choice Rules

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Multi-Agent Systems and Applications IV (CEEMAS 2005)

Part of the book series: Lecture Notes in Computer Science ((LNAI,volume 3690))

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Abstract

Intelligent systems play a crucial role in our everyday life. Yet there is still no general concept for designing such systems (at an individual, social, and inter-social level). Intelligent systems are designed on a case-by-case basis, mostly in an ad-hoc fashion lacking any kind of general design strategy. Nonetheless there are theories, which capture some profound aspects of the problem. One of them is the theory of implementation of social choice rules, which is concerned with the collective behavior in multi-agent systems. However the roots of the theory lie in social sciences, so its approach is not suitable enough for multi-agent system design. This article introduces a new game theoretic approach to implementation of social choice rules, which enables design of provably optimal multi-agent system without any restriction in general.

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© 2005 Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg

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Kovács, D.L. (2005). Virtual Games: A New Approach to Implementation of Social Choice Rules. In: Pěchouček, M., Petta, P., Varga, L.Z. (eds) Multi-Agent Systems and Applications IV. CEEMAS 2005. Lecture Notes in Computer Science(), vol 3690. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/11559221_27

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/11559221_27

  • Publisher Name: Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg

  • Print ISBN: 978-3-540-29046-9

  • Online ISBN: 978-3-540-31731-9

  • eBook Packages: Computer ScienceComputer Science (R0)

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