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A Mechanism for Multiple Goods and Interdependent Valuations

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Agent-Mediated Electronic Commerce VI. Theories for and Engineering of Distributed Mechanisms and Systems (AMEC 2004)

Part of the book series: Lecture Notes in Computer Science ((LNAI,volume 3435))

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Abstract

This paper reports on the design of an auction mechanism for allocating multiple goods when the buyers have interdependent valuations. We cast the problem as a multi-agent system consisting of selfish, rational agents and develop an auction mechanism which is efficient, incentive compatible and individually rational. We first discuss the necessary assumptions that any mechanism developed for this scenario should satisfy so as to achieve the aforementioned properties. We then present our mechanism and show how it is a generalisation of the Vickrey-Clarke-Groves mechanism.

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Author information

Authors and Affiliations

  1. School of Electronics and Computer Science, University of Southampton, Southampton, SO17 1BJ, UK

    Rajdeep K. Dash, Alex Rogers & Nicholas R. Jennings

Authors
  1. Rajdeep K. Dash
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  2. Alex Rogers
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  3. Nicholas R. Jennings
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Editor information

Editors and Affiliations

  1. Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Computer Science and Artificial Intelligence Laboratory, Massachusetts Avenue, 02139, Cambridge, USA

    Peyman Faratin

  2. IIIA, Artificial Intelligence Research Institute CSIC, Spanish Research Council, Campus, UAB, 08193, Bellaterra, Spain

    Juan A. Rodríguez-Aguilar

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© 2006 Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg

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Dash, R.K., Rogers, A., Jennings, N.R. (2006). A Mechanism for Multiple Goods and Interdependent Valuations. In: Faratin, P., Rodríguez-Aguilar, J.A. (eds) Agent-Mediated Electronic Commerce VI. Theories for and Engineering of Distributed Mechanisms and Systems. AMEC 2004. Lecture Notes in Computer Science(), vol 3435. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/11575726_2

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/11575726_2

  • Publisher Name: Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg

  • Print ISBN: 978-3-540-29737-6

  • Online ISBN: 978-3-540-33166-7

  • eBook Packages: Computer ScienceComputer Science (R0)

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