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“CONFESS”. Eliciting Honest Feedback Without Independent Verification Authorities

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Agent-Mediated Electronic Commerce VI. Theories for and Engineering of Distributed Mechanisms and Systems (AMEC 2004)

Part of the book series: Lecture Notes in Computer Science ((LNAI,volume 3435))

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Abstract

Reputation mechanisms offer an efficient way of building the necessary level of trust in electronic markets. In the absence of independent verification authorities that can reveal the true outcome of a transaction, market designers have to ensure that it is in the best interest of the trading agents to report the behavior in transactions truthfully. As opposed to side-payment schemes that correlate a present report with future reports submitted about the same agent, we present a mechanism we have called “CONFESS”, that discovers (in equilibrium) the true outcome of a transaction by analyzing the two reports coming from the agents involved in the exchange. For two long-run rational agents, we show that it is possible to design such a mechanism that makes cooperation a stable equilibrium.

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Author information

Authors and Affiliations

  1. Artificial Intelligence Laboratory (LIA), Swiss Federal Institute of Technology (EPFL), CH-1015, Lausanne, Switzerland

    Radu Jurca & Boi Faltings

Authors
  1. Radu Jurca
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  2. Boi Faltings
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Editor information

Editors and Affiliations

  1. Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Computer Science and Artificial Intelligence Laboratory, Massachusetts Avenue, 02139, Cambridge, USA

    Peyman Faratin

  2. IIIA, Artificial Intelligence Research Institute CSIC, Spanish Research Council, Campus, UAB, 08193, Bellaterra, Spain

    Juan A. Rodríguez-Aguilar

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© 2006 Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg

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Jurca, R., Faltings, B. (2006). “CONFESS”. Eliciting Honest Feedback Without Independent Verification Authorities. In: Faratin, P., Rodríguez-Aguilar, J.A. (eds) Agent-Mediated Electronic Commerce VI. Theories for and Engineering of Distributed Mechanisms and Systems. AMEC 2004. Lecture Notes in Computer Science(), vol 3435. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/11575726_5

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/11575726_5

  • Publisher Name: Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg

  • Print ISBN: 978-3-540-29737-6

  • Online ISBN: 978-3-540-33166-7

  • eBook Packages: Computer ScienceComputer Science (R0)

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