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Auctions and Bidding with Information

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Agent-Mediated Electronic Commerce VI. Theories for and Engineering of Distributed Mechanisms and Systems (AMEC 2004)

Part of the book series: Lecture Notes in Computer Science ((LNAI,volume 3435))

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Abstract

An approach to auctions and bidding is founded on observations and expectations of the opponents’ behavior and not on assumptions concerning the opponents’ motivations or internal reasoning. A bidding agent operates in an information-rich environment that includes real-time market data and data extracted from the World Wide Web. This agent employs maximum entropy inference to determine its actions on the basis of this uncertain data. Maximum entropy inference may be applied both to multi-issue and to single-issue negotiation. Multi-issue variants of the four common auction mechanisms are discussed.

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Author information

Authors and Affiliations

  1. Faculty of Information Technology, University of Technology, Sydney, NSW, Australia

    John Debenham

Authors
  1. John Debenham
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Editor information

Editors and Affiliations

  1. Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Computer Science and Artificial Intelligence Laboratory, Massachusetts Avenue, 02139, Cambridge, USA

    Peyman Faratin

  2. IIIA, Artificial Intelligence Research Institute CSIC, Spanish Research Council, Campus, UAB, 08193, Bellaterra, Spain

    Juan A. Rodríguez-Aguilar

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© 2006 Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg

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Debenham, J. (2006). Auctions and Bidding with Information. In: Faratin, P., Rodríguez-Aguilar, J.A. (eds) Agent-Mediated Electronic Commerce VI. Theories for and Engineering of Distributed Mechanisms and Systems. AMEC 2004. Lecture Notes in Computer Science(), vol 3435. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/11575726_9

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/11575726_9

  • Publisher Name: Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg

  • Print ISBN: 978-3-540-29737-6

  • Online ISBN: 978-3-540-33166-7

  • eBook Packages: Computer ScienceComputer Science (R0)

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