Abstract
Control-Flow Integrity (CFI) means that the execution of a program dynamically follows only certain paths, in accordance with a static policy. CFI can prevent attacks that, by exploiting buffer overflows and other vulnerabilities, attempt to control program behavior. This paper develops the basic theory that underlies two practical techniques for CFI enforcement, with precise formulations of hypotheses and guarantees.
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Abadi, M., Budiu, M., Erlingsson, Ú., Ligatti, J. (2005). A Theory of Secure Control Flow. In: Lau, KK., Banach, R. (eds) Formal Methods and Software Engineering. ICFEM 2005. Lecture Notes in Computer Science, vol 3785. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/11576280_9
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/11576280_9
Publisher Name: Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg
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