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New Results on the Complexity of Uniformly Mixed Nash Equilibria

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Internet and Network Economics (WINE 2005)

Part of the book series: Lecture Notes in Computer Science ((LNISA,volume 3828))

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Abstract

We are interested in the complexity of finding Nash equilibria with one uniformly mixed strategy (that is, equilibria in which at least one of the players plays a uniform probability distribution over some set of pure strategies). We show that, even in imitation bimatrix games, where one player has a positive payoff if he plays the same pure strategy as the opponent, deciding the existence of such an equilibrium is an NP-complete problem. We derive this result from the NP-completeness of graph-theoretical problems strictly related to this class of equilibria.

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Bonifaci, V., Di Iorio, U., Laura, L. (2005). New Results on the Complexity of Uniformly Mixed Nash Equilibria. In: Deng, X., Ye, Y. (eds) Internet and Network Economics. WINE 2005. Lecture Notes in Computer Science, vol 3828. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/11600930_103

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/11600930_103

  • Publisher Name: Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg

  • Print ISBN: 978-3-540-30900-0

  • Online ISBN: 978-3-540-32293-1

  • eBook Packages: Computer ScienceComputer Science (R0)

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