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A Simple Characterization for Truth-Revealing Single-Item Auctions

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Internet and Network Economics (WINE 2005)

Part of the book series: Lecture Notes in Computer Science ((LNISA,volume 3828))

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Abstract

We give a simple characterization of all single-item truth-revealing auctions under some mild (and natural) assumptions about the auctions. Our work opens up the possibility of using variational calculus to design auctions having desired properties.

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© 2005 Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg

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Jain, K., Mehta, A., Talwar, K., Vazirani, V. (2005). A Simple Characterization for Truth-Revealing Single-Item Auctions. In: Deng, X., Ye, Y. (eds) Internet and Network Economics. WINE 2005. Lecture Notes in Computer Science, vol 3828. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/11600930_13

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/11600930_13

  • Publisher Name: Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg

  • Print ISBN: 978-3-540-30900-0

  • Online ISBN: 978-3-540-32293-1

  • eBook Packages: Computer ScienceComputer Science (R0)

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