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Experimental Evaluation of an eBay-Style Self-reporting Reputation Mechanism

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Internet and Network Economics (WINE 2005)

Part of the book series: Lecture Notes in Computer Science ((LNISA,volume 3828))

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Abstract

We experimentally studied the effects of a eBay-style self-reporting reputation mechanism in an double-sided exchange economy in which participants have the option of not fulfilling their contracts. We found that submitted reports quite accurately reflected their transactions and this mechanism maintaining a high contract fulfillment rate. The inaccurate reports, which were about 5% of the total, were heavily biased towards bad ratings when the transaction is successful. This is strong evidence that the inaccurate reports were not results of random errors, but derived from an underlying behavior effect. Our experimental design allowed identifying the effect of reputation mechanism on endogenous market behavior.

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© 2005 Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg

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Chen, KY., Hogg, T. (2005). Experimental Evaluation of an eBay-Style Self-reporting Reputation Mechanism. In: Deng, X., Ye, Y. (eds) Internet and Network Economics. WINE 2005. Lecture Notes in Computer Science, vol 3828. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/11600930_43

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/11600930_43

  • Publisher Name: Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg

  • Print ISBN: 978-3-540-30900-0

  • Online ISBN: 978-3-540-32293-1

  • eBook Packages: Computer ScienceComputer Science (R0)

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