Abstract
In the Internet market, the revenue of an information gatekeeper comes in two forms: advertising fees paid by firms who post their prices at the gatekeeper’s site, and subscription fees paid by consumers who obtain the list of prices charged by different firms from the gatekeeper’s site. By extending Varian’s (1980) Model of Sales, this paper establishes conditions for an information gatekeeper to offer totally free subscriptions to consumers.
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© 2005 Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg
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Chen, Q., Zhang, WG., Kuang, G. (2005). Why Do Information Gatekeepers Charge Zero Subscription Fees?. In: Deng, X., Ye, Y. (eds) Internet and Network Economics. WINE 2005. Lecture Notes in Computer Science, vol 3828. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/11600930_91
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/11600930_91
Publisher Name: Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg
Print ISBN: 978-3-540-30900-0
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