Abstract
This extended abstract describes an alternative to trusting individual nodes in pervasive systems, which is to exploit the diversity of nodes in such systems to build application ensembles that are collectively trustworthy. These configurations are resilient to high levels of attack, and are not dependent on large pre-distribution key-spaces.
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© 2006 Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg
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Chivers, H. (2006). Trust Without Identification. In: Clark, J.A., Paige, R.F., Polack, F.A.C., Brooke, P.J. (eds) Security in Pervasive Computing. SPC 2006. Lecture Notes in Computer Science, vol 3934. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/11734666_1
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/11734666_1
Publisher Name: Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg
Print ISBN: 978-3-540-33376-0
Online ISBN: 978-3-540-33377-7
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