Abstract
This paper presents a model of non-linear common-pool resource experiments with boundedly rational agents. The model is based on data of experiments with and without communication and reproduces individual and not only aggregated data. It is part of a framework for modeling economic experiments. The agents exhibit bounded rationality in the sense that they use simple heuristics and simple learning processes in an aspiration adaptation process, and base their decisions on norms and “’emotions”. A major objective of this kind of modeling is to implement agents in a way that makes it possible for humans to identify with agent behaviour.
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Ebenhöh, E. (2006). Modeling Non-linear Common-Pool Resource Experiments with Boundedly Rational Agents. In: Sichman, J.S., Antunes, L. (eds) Multi-Agent-Based Simulation VI. MABS 2005. Lecture Notes in Computer Science(), vol 3891. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/11734680_10
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/11734680_10
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