Abstract
Deterrence is the “holy grail” of counter-terrorism: a strategy that offers the promise of reducing or eliminating terror attacks at minimal cost. Israel’s experience has shown, however, that while many tactics have been promoted as deterrents, very few have actually worked. As claimed deterrence can be used to justify retributive policies that are unjust or simply unwise, it is important to apply careful thought before implementing such policies.
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© 2006 Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg
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Radlauer, D. (2006). Rational Choice Deterrence and Israeli Counter-Terrorism. In: Mehrotra, S., Zeng, D.D., Chen, H., Thuraisingham, B., Wang, FY. (eds) Intelligence and Security Informatics. ISI 2006. Lecture Notes in Computer Science, vol 3975. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/11760146_65
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/11760146_65
Publisher Name: Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg
Print ISBN: 978-3-540-34478-0
Online ISBN: 978-3-540-34479-7
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