Abstract
Conventional PKI is the most effective and efficient solution to non-repudiation. But, it also puts user privacy in danger because the user’s activities could be tracked via the unique public-key and certificate he presents in multiple transactions. Pseudonymous PKI (PPKI) solution achieves non-repudiation as well as privacy protection at the same time by providing Pseudonymous Public-Key (PPK) and Pseudonymous Certificate (PCert) that are computed by the user without CA intervention. PPK is as effective as conventional public-key in terms of non-repudiation. Furthermore, the PPKI solution is very efficient in terms of the size of PPK and PCert, and is scalable in terms of certification authority overhead. Therefore PPKI is particularly suitable for ubiquitous computing environments where authenticity, non-repudiation, privacy protection, efficiency, and scalability are key requirements.
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Zeng, K. (2006). Pseudonymous PKI for Ubiquitous Computing. In: Atzeni, A.S., Lioy, A. (eds) Public Key Infrastructure. EuroPKI 2006. Lecture Notes in Computer Science, vol 4043. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/11774716_17
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/11774716_17
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