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Weighted Popular Matchings

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Automata, Languages and Programming (ICALP 2006)

Part of the book series: Lecture Notes in Computer Science ((LNTCS,volume 4051))

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Abstract

We study the problem of assigning applicants to jobs. Each applicant has a weight and provides a preference list, which may contain ties, ranking a subset of the jobs. An applicant x may prefer one matching over the other (or be indifferent between them, in case of a tie) based on the jobs x gets in the two matchings and x’s personal preference. A matching M is popular if there is no other matching M′ such that the weight of the applicants who prefer M′ over M exceeds the weight of those who prefer M over M′.

We present two algorithms to find a popular matching, or in case none exists, to establish so. For the case of strict preferences we develop an O(n+m) time algorithm. When ties are allowed a more involved algorithm solves the problem in \(O(\min(k \sqrt{n}, n) m)\) time, where k is the number of distinct weights the applicants are given.

Research supported by NSF Awards CCR 0113192 and CCF 0430650.

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Author information

Authors and Affiliations

  1. Department of Computer Science, University of Maryland, College Park, MD, 20742, USA

    Julián Mestre

Authors
  1. Julián Mestre
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Editor information

Editors and Affiliations

  1. Dipartimento di Informatica, Università Ca’ Foscari, Venice

    Michele Bugliesi

  2. Interdisciplinary Institute for BroadBand Technology (IBBT), Belgium

    Bart Preneel

  3. ECS, University of Southampton, UK

    Vladimiro Sassone

  4. FB Informatik, Univ. Dortmund, LS2, 44221, Dortmund, Germany

    Ingo Wegener

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© 2006 Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg

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Mestre, J. (2006). Weighted Popular Matchings. In: Bugliesi, M., Preneel, B., Sassone, V., Wegener, I. (eds) Automata, Languages and Programming. ICALP 2006. Lecture Notes in Computer Science, vol 4051. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/11786986_62

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/11786986_62

  • Publisher Name: Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg

  • Print ISBN: 978-3-540-35904-3

  • Online ISBN: 978-3-540-35905-0

  • eBook Packages: Computer ScienceComputer Science (R0)

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