Skip to main content
Springer Nature Link
Log in

The CL-Atse Protocol Analyser

  • Conference paper
Term Rewriting and Applications (RTA 2006)

Part of the book series: Lecture Notes in Computer Science ((LNTCS,volume 4098))

Included in the following conference series:

  • 554 Accesses

Abstract

This paper presents an overview of the CL-Atse tool, an efficient and versatile automatic analyser for the security of cryptographic protocols. CL-Atse takes as input a protocol specified as a set of rewriting rules (IF format, produced by the AVISPA compiler), and uses rewriting and constraint solving techniques to model all reachable states of the participants and decide if an attack exists w.r.t. the Dolev-Yao intruder. Any state-based security property can be modelled (like secrecy, authentication, fairness, etc...), and the algebraic properties of operators like xor or exponentiation are taken into account with much less limitations than other tools, thanks to a complete modular unification algorithm. Also, useful constraints like typing, inequalities, or shared sets of knowledge (with set operations like removes, negative tests, etc...) can also be analysed.

This is a preview of subscription content, log in via an institution to check access.

Access this chapter

Log in via an institution

Institutional subscriptions

Preview

Unable to display preview. Download preview PDF.

Unable to display preview. Download preview PDF.

Similar content being viewed by others

References

  1. Amadio, R., Lugiez, D., Vanackère, V.: On the symbolic reduction of processes with cryptographic functions. Theor. Comput. Sci. 290(1), 695–740 (2003)

    Article  MATH  Google Scholar 

  2. The AVISPA Team: The Avispa Tool for the automated validation of internet security protocols and applications. In: Etessami, K., Rajamani, S.K. (eds.) CAV 2005. LNCS, vol. 3576, pp. 281–285. Springer, Heidelberg (2005)

    Chapter  Google Scholar 

  3. Armando, A., Compagna, L.: An Optimized Intruder Model for SAT-based Model-Checking of Security Protocols. In: Proceedings of the Workshop on Automated Reasoning for Security Protocol Analysis (ARSPA 2004). ENTCS, vol. 125(1), pp. 91–108 (2005)

    Google Scholar 

  4. Baader, F., Schulz, K.U.: Unification in the Union of Disjoint Equational Theories: Combining Decision Procedures. Journal of Symbolic Computing 21(2), 211–243 (1996)

    Article  MATH  MathSciNet  Google Scholar 

  5. Basin, D., Mödersheim, S., Viganò, L.: OFMC: A symbolic model checker for security protocols. International Journal of Information Security 4(3), 181–208 (2005)

    Article  Google Scholar 

  6. Boichut, Y., Héam, P.-C., Kouchnarenko, O.: Automatic Verification of Security Protocols Using Approximations. INRIA Research Report (October 2005)

    Google Scholar 

  7. Boreale, M.: Symbolic trace analysis of cryptographic protocols. In: Orejas, F., Spirakis, P.G., van Leeuwen, J. (eds.) ICALP 2001. LNCS, vol. 2076, pp. 667–681. Springer, Heidelberg (2001)

    Chapter  Google Scholar 

  8. Chevalier, Y., Küsters, R., Rusinowitch, M., Turuani, M.: An NP decision procedure for protocol insecurity with xor. In: Proceedings of LICS 2003 (2003)

    Google Scholar 

  9. Chevalier, Y., Küsters, R., Rusinowitch, M., Turuani, M.: Deciding the Security of Protocols with Diffie-Hellman Exponentiation and Products in Exponents. In: Pandya, P.K., Radhakrishnan, J. (eds.) FSTTCS 2003. LNCS, vol. 2914, pp. 124–135. Springer, Heidelberg (2003)

    Chapter  Google Scholar 

  10. Chevalier, Y., Vigneron, L.: A Tool for Lazy Verification of Security Protocols. In: Proceedings of the Automated Software Engineering Conference (ASE 2001). IEEE CSP, Los Alamitos (2001)

    Google Scholar 

  11. Clark, J. Jacob, J.: A Survey of Authentication Protocol Literature: Version 1.0, (November 17, 1997), URL: www.cs.york.ac.uk/~jac/papers/drareview.ps.gz

  12. Corin, R., Etalle, S.: An improved constraint-based system for the verification of security protocols. In: Hermenegildo, M.V., Puebla, G. (eds.) SAS 2002. LNCS, vol. 2477, pp. 326–341. Springer, Heidelberg (2002)

    Chapter  Google Scholar 

  13. Dolev, D., Yao, A.C.: On the Security of Public-Key Protocols. IEEE Transactions on Information Theory 29(2), 198–208 (1983)

    Article  MATH  MathSciNet  Google Scholar 

  14. Meadows, C.: Open issues in formal methods for cryptographic protocol analysis. In: Proceedings of DISCEX 2000, pp. 237–250. IEEE Computer Society Press, Los Alamitos (2000)

    Google Scholar 

  15. Millen, J., Shmatikov, V.: Symbolic protocol analysis with products and Diffie-Hellman exponentiation. In: Proceedings of the 16th IEEE Computer Security Foundations Workshop (CSFW 2003), pp. 47–61 (2003)

    Google Scholar 

  16. Rusinowitch, M., Turuani, M.: Protocol Insecurity with Finite Number of Sessions is NP-complete. In: 14th IEEE Computer Security Foundations Workshop (CSFW-14), pp. 174–190 (2001)

    Google Scholar 

Download references

Author information

Authors and Affiliations

  1. Loria-INRIA, Vandoeuvre-lès-Nancy, France

    Mathieu Turuani

Authors
  1. Mathieu Turuani
    View author publications

    You can also search for this author in PubMed Google Scholar

Editor information

Editors and Affiliations

  1. Carnegie Mellon University,  

    Frank Pfenning

Rights and permissions

Reprints and permissions

Copyright information

© 2006 Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg

About this paper

Cite this paper

Turuani, M. (2006). The CL-Atse Protocol Analyser. In: Pfenning, F. (eds) Term Rewriting and Applications. RTA 2006. Lecture Notes in Computer Science, vol 4098. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/11805618_21

Download citation

  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/11805618_21

  • Publisher Name: Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg

  • Print ISBN: 978-3-540-36834-2

  • Online ISBN: 978-3-540-36835-9

  • eBook Packages: Computer ScienceComputer Science (R0)

Publish with us

Policies and ethics