Abstract
In this paper we make progress towards solving an open problem posed by Katz and Yung at CRYPTO 2003. We propose the first protocol for key exchange among n ≥2k+1 parties which simultaneously achieves all of the following properties:
1. Key Privacy (including forward security) against active attacks by group outsiders,
2. Non-malleability — meaning in particular that no subset of up to k corrupted group insiders can ‘fix’ the agreed key to a desired value, and
3. Robustness against denial of service attacks by up to k corrupted group insiders.
Our insider security properties above are achieved assuming the availability of a reliable broadcast channel.
This is a preview of subscription content, log in via an institution to check access.
Preview
Unable to display preview. Download preview PDF.
Similar content being viewed by others
References
Bellare, M., Desai, A., Pointcheval, D., Rogaway, P.: Relations among Notions of Security for Public-Key Encryption Schemes. In: Krawczyk, H. (ed.) CRYPTO 1998. LNCS, vol. 1462, pp. 26–45. Springer, Heidelberg (1998)
Bellare, M., Pointcheval, D., Rogaway, P.: Authenticated Key Exchange Secure against Dictionary Attacks. In: Preneel, B. (ed.) EUROCRYPT 2000. LNCS, vol. 1807, pp. 139–155. Springer, Heidelberg (2000)
Boyd, C., Nieto, J.: Round-Optimal Contributory Conference Key Agreement. In: Desmedt, Y.G. (ed.) PKC 2003. LNCS, vol. 2567, pp. 161–174. Springer, Heidelberg (2002)
Bresson, E., Chevassut, O., Pointcheval, D.: Provably Authenticated Group Diffie-Hellman Key Exchange - The Dynamic Case. In: Boyd, C. (ed.) ASIACRYPT 2001. LNCS, vol. 2248, pp. 290–309. Springer, Heidelberg (2001)
Bresson, E., Chevassut, O., Pointcheval, D.: Dynamic Group Diffie-Hellman Key Exchange under Standard Assumptions. In: Knudsen, L.R. (ed.) EUROCRYPT 2002. LNCS, vol. 2332, pp. 321–336. Springer, Heidelberg (2002)
Bresson, E., Chevassut, O., Pointcheval, D., Quisquater, J.: Provably Authenticated Group Diffie-Hellman Key Exchange. In: Comunications and Computer Security Conference CCS 2001, pp. 255–264. ACM, New York (2001)
Burmester, M., Desmedt, Y.G.: A Secure and Efficient Conference Key Distribution System. In: De Santis, A. (ed.) EUROCRYPT 1994. LNCS, vol. 950, pp. 275–286. Springer, Heidelberg (1995)
Canetti, R.: Universally composable security: A new paradigm for cryptographic protocols. Cryptology ePrint Archive, Report 2000/067 (2005), Available from: http://eprint.iacr.org/
Cleve, R.: Limits on the Security of Coin Flips When Half the Processors are Faulty. In: Proc. 18-th STOC, pp. 364–369. ACM Press, New York (1986)
Diffie, W., Hellman, M.: New Directions in Cryptography. IEEE Trans. on Information Theory 22, 644–654 (1976)
Gennaro, R., Jarecki, S., Krawczyk, H., Rabin, T.: Secure Distributed Key Generation for Discrete-Log Based Cryptosystems. In: Stern, J. (ed.) EUROCRYPT 1999. LNCS, vol. 1592, pp. 295–310. Springer, Heidelberg (1999)
Katz, J., Sun Shin, J.: Modeling Insider Attacks on Group Key-Exchange Protocols. In: Comunications and Computer Security Conference CCS 2005, pp. 180–189. ACM, New York (2005)
Katz, J., Yung, M.: Scalable Protocols for Authenticated Group Key Exchange. In: Boneh, D. (ed.) CRYPTO 2003. LNCS, vol. 2729, pp. 110–125. Springer, Heidelberg (2003)
Lampson, B.W.: A note on the confinement problem. Comm. ACM 16(10), 613–615 (1973)
Pedersen, T.P.: Non-interactive and Information-Theoretic Secure Verifiable Secret Sharing. In: Feigenbaum, J. (ed.) CRYPTO 1991. LNCS, vol. 576, pp. 129–140. Springer, Heidelberg (1992)
Pieprzyk, J., Wang, H.: Key Control in Multi-party Key Agreement Protocols. In: Workshop on Coding, Cryptography and Combinatorics (CCC 2003). LNCS. Springer, Berlin (2003)
Simmons, G.J.: The prisoners’ problem and the subliminal channel. In: Chaum, D. (ed.) Advances in Cryptology. Proc. of Crypto 1983, Santa Barbara, California, August 1983, pp. 51–67. Plenum Press, N.Y (1984)
Author information
Authors and Affiliations
Editor information
Editors and Affiliations
Rights and permissions
Copyright information
© 2006 Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg
About this paper
Cite this paper
Desmedt, Y., Pieprzyk, J., Steinfeld, R., Wang, H. (2006). A Non-malleable Group Key Exchange Protocol Robust Against Active Insiders. In: Katsikas, S.K., López, J., Backes, M., Gritzalis, S., Preneel, B. (eds) Information Security. ISC 2006. Lecture Notes in Computer Science, vol 4176. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/11836810_33
Download citation
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/11836810_33
Publisher Name: Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg
Print ISBN: 978-3-540-38341-3
Online ISBN: 978-3-540-38343-7
eBook Packages: Computer ScienceComputer Science (R0)