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Formalising Receipt-Freeness

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Information Security (ISC 2006)

Part of the book series: Lecture Notes in Computer Science ((LNSC,volume 4176))

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Abstract

Receipt-freeness is the property of voting protocols that a voter cannot create a receipt which proves how she voted. Since Benaloh and Tuinstra introduced this property, there has been a large amount of work devoted to the construction of receipt-free voting protocols. This paper provides a generic and uniform formalism that captures the notion of a receipt. The formalism is then applied to analyse the receipt-freeness of a number of voting protocols.

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Author information

Authors and Affiliations

  1. Dept. of Math. and Comp. Sc., Technische Universiteit Eindhoven, P.O. Box 513, 5600, MB Eindhoven, The Netherlands

    H. L. Jonker & E. P. de Vink

  2. LIACS, Leiden University, Niels Bohrweg 1, 2333, CA Leiden, The Netherlands

    E. P. de Vink

Authors
  1. H. L. Jonker
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  2. E. P. de Vink
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Editor information

Editors and Affiliations

  1. University of the Aegean, University Hill, 81100, Mytilene, Greece

    Sokratis K. Katsikas

  2. Department of Information and Communication Technologies, University of A Coruña, Spain

    Javier López

  3. MPI-SWS,  

    Michael Backes

  4. Department of Information and Communication Systems Engineering, University of the Aegean, Karlovassi, Samos, Greece

    Stefanos Gritzalis

  5. Interdisciplinary Institute for BroadBand Technology (IBBT), Belgium

    Bart Preneel

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© 2006 Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg

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Jonker, H.L., de Vink, E.P. (2006). Formalising Receipt-Freeness. In: Katsikas, S.K., López, J., Backes, M., Gritzalis, S., Preneel, B. (eds) Information Security. ISC 2006. Lecture Notes in Computer Science, vol 4176. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/11836810_34

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/11836810_34

  • Publisher Name: Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg

  • Print ISBN: 978-3-540-38341-3

  • Online ISBN: 978-3-540-38343-7

  • eBook Packages: Computer ScienceComputer Science (R0)

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