Abstract
The increase of complexity in aircraft systems demands for enhanced analysis techniques. Methods are required that leverage the burden of their application by reusing existing design and process information and by enforcing the reusability of analyses results allowing early identification of design’s weak points and check of design alternatives.This report elaborates on a method that assumes a system specification in an industrial standard notation and allows to perform several formal safety analyses. Based on a collection of failure models and means of specifying safety requirements, the techniques produce results along the lines of traditional methods.
We show how to combine traditional techniques, required by the AerospaceRecommendedPractice (SAE-ARP) standards, likeFaultTree Analysis, Failure Mode and Effect Analysis and Common Cause Analysis and also how to automate most of the analysis activities.
The methods described in this paper can be used as means to support the Certification process.
This work was supported by the European Commission within the projects ESACS (Enhanced Safety Assessment for Complex Systems, FP5), http://www.esacs.org/, and ISAAC (Improvement of Safety Activities on Aeronautical Complex systems, FP6), http://www.isaac-fp6.org/
This is a preview of subscription content, log in via an institution to check access.
Access this chapter
Tax calculation will be finalised at checkout
Purchases are for personal use only
Preview
Unable to display preview. Download preview PDF.
References
Harel, D., Politi, M.: Modelling Reactive Systems with Statecharts: The STATEMATE Approach. McGraw-Hill, New York (1998)
The MathWorks: Simulink — Model-Based and System-Based Design (2004)
Bienmüller, T., Damm, W., Wittke, H.: The STATEMATE Verification Environment - Making It Real. In: Emerson, E.A., Sistla, A.P. (eds.) CAV 2000. LNCS, vol. 1855, pp. 561–567. Springer, Heidelberg (2000)
Joshi, A., Heimdahl, M.P.: Model-Based Safety Analysis of Simulink Models Using SCADE Design Verifier. In: Winther, R., Gran, B.A., Dahll, G. (eds.) SAFECOMP 2005. LNCS, vol. 3688, pp. 122–135. Springer, Heidelberg (2005)
ARP4761: Guidelines and Methods for Conducting the Safety Assessment Process on Civil Airborne Systems and Equipment. Aerospace Recommended Practice, Society of Automotive Engineers, Detroit, USA (1996)
Peikenkamp, T., Cavallo, A., Valacca, L., Böde, E., Pretzer, M., Hahn, E.M. (2006), http://seshome.informatik.uni-oldenburg.de/~sesdocs/safecomp2006
Clarke, E., Grumberg, O., Peled, D.: Model Checking. MIT Press, Cambridge (1999)
I-Logix: ModelCertifier User Manual. I-Logix, Andover, MA (2002/2003)
Vesely, W.E., Goldberg, F., Roberts, N.H., Haasl, D.F.: Fault Tree Handbook. NUREG-0492. U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, DC (1981)
Peikenkamp, T., Böde, E., Brückner, I., Spenke, H., Bretschneider, M., Holberg, H.: Model-based Safety Analysis of a Flap Control System. In: Proc. of INCOSE, Toulouse (2004)
Drechsler, R., Becker, B.: Binary Decision Diagrams – Theory and Implementation. Kluwer Academic Publishers, Dordrecht (1998)
Somenzi, F.: CUDD: CU Decision Diagram Package Release 2.4.1. University of Colorado at Boulder (2005)
Schellhorn, G., Thums, A., Reif, W.: Formal fault tree semantics. In: IDPT 2002: Interated Design and Process Technology (2002)
Hansen, K.M.: Linking Safety Analysis to Safety Requirements. Ph.D thesis, Institut for Informationsteknologi, DTU Lyngby (1996)
Schäfer, A.: Combining real-time model-checking and fault tree analysis. In: Araki, K., Gnesi, S., Mandrioli, D. (eds.) FME 2003. LNCS, vol. 2805. Springer, Heidelberg (2003)
Papadopoulos, Y., Maruhn, M.: Model-based synthesis of fault trees from Matlab-Simulink models. In: The International Conference on Dependable Systems and Networks (DSN 2001) (2001)
Papadopoulos, Y., McDermid, J.A.: Hierarchically performed hazard origin and propagation studies. Springer, Heidelberg (1999)
Bozzano, M., et al.: ESACS: An integrated methodology for design and safety analysis of complex systems. In: ESREL (2003)
Hermanns, H. (ed.): Interactive Markov Chains. LNCS, vol. 2428, p. 129. Springer, Heidelberg (2002)
Baier, C., et al.: Efficient computation of time-bounded reachability probabilities in uniform continuous-time markov decision processes. Theor. Comput. Sci. 345(1), 2–26 (2005)
Herbstritt, M., Wimmer, R., Peikenkamp, T., Böde, E., Hermanns, H., Adelaide, M., Becker, B.: Analysis of Large Safety-Critical Systems: A quantitative approach. Reports of SFB/TR 14 AVACS 8 (2006), http://www.avacs.org ISSN: 1860-9821
Author information
Authors and Affiliations
Editor information
Editors and Affiliations
Rights and permissions
Copyright information
© 2006 Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg
About this paper
Cite this paper
Peikenkamp, T., Cavallo, A., Valacca, L., Böde, E., Pretzer, M., Hahn, E.M. (2006). Towards a Unified Model-Based Safety Assessment. In: Górski, J. (eds) Computer Safety, Reliability, and Security. SAFECOMP 2006. Lecture Notes in Computer Science, vol 4166. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/11875567_21
Download citation
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/11875567_21
Publisher Name: Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg
Print ISBN: 978-3-540-45762-6
Online ISBN: 978-3-540-45763-3
eBook Packages: Computer ScienceComputer Science (R0)