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An Efficient Publicly Verifiable Mix-Net for Long Inputs

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Financial Cryptography and Data Security (FC 2006)

Part of the book series: Lecture Notes in Computer Science ((LNSC,volume 4107))

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Abstract

We propose here the first efficient publicly verifiable hybrid mix-net. Previous publicly verifiable mix-net was only efficient for short ciphertexts and was not suitable for mixing long messages. Previous hybrid mix-net can mix long messages but did not have public verifiability. The proposed scheme is efficient enough to treat large scale electronic questionnaires of long messages as well as voting with write-ins, and offers public verifiability of the correctness of the tally. The scheme is provably secure if we assume random oracles, semantic security of a one-time symmetric-key cryptosystem, and intractability of decision Diffie-Hellman problem.

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Authors and Affiliations

  1. NEC Corporation, 1753, Shimonumabe, Nakahara, Kawasaki, 211-8666, Japan

    Jun Furukawa & Kazue Sako

Authors
  1. Jun Furukawa
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  2. Kazue Sako
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Editors and Affiliations

  1. Telcordia Technologies, Piscataway, NJ, USA

    Giovanni Di Crescenzo

  2. Johns Hopkins University (JHUISI), 3100 Wyman Park Drive, 21211, Baltimor, MD, USA

    Avi Rubin

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Furukawa, J., Sako, K. (2006). An Efficient Publicly Verifiable Mix-Net for Long Inputs. In: Di Crescenzo, G., Rubin, A. (eds) Financial Cryptography and Data Security. FC 2006. Lecture Notes in Computer Science, vol 4107. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/11889663_8

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/11889663_8

  • Publisher Name: Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg

  • Print ISBN: 978-3-540-46255-2

  • Online ISBN: 978-3-540-46256-9

  • eBook Packages: Computer ScienceComputer Science (R0)

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