Abstract
We show that timely induction of random failures can potentially be used to mount very cost effective attacks against smartcards deploying cryptographic schemes based on (right-to-left) modular exponentiation. We introduce a model where an external perturbation, or glitch, may cause a single modular multiplication to produce a truly random result. Based on this assumption, we present a probabilistic attack against the implemented cryptosystem. Under reasonable assumptions, we prove that using a single faulty signature the attack recovers a target bit of the secret exponent with an error probability bounded by \(\frac 3 7\). We show the attack is effective even in the presence of message blinding.
Author’s address: Dipartimento di Sistemi e Informatica, Viale Morgagni 65, I–50134 Firenze, Italy. Email: boreale@dsi.unifi.it. Work partially supported by the eu within the fet-gc2 initiative, project sensoria, and by University of Firenze, projects ”ex-60%”.
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Boreale, M. (2006). Attacking Right-to-Left Modular Exponentiation with Timely Random Faults. In: Breveglieri, L., Koren, I., Naccache, D., Seifert, JP. (eds) Fault Diagnosis and Tolerance in Cryptography. FDTC 2006. Lecture Notes in Computer Science, vol 4236. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/11889700_3
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/11889700_3
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