Abstract
We consider a decentralized setting in which agents exchange data along with usage policies. Agents may violate the intended usage policies, although later on auditing authorities may verify the agents’ data accountability with respect to the intended policies. Using time-stamping and signature schemes, we design and analyze an efficient cryptographic protocol generating communication evidences, in such a way that an agent is accountable in our protocol only if the agent behaved honestly.
An erratum to this chapter can be found at http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/11915034_125.
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Corin, R., Galindo, D., Hoepman, JH. (2006). Securing Data Accountability in Decentralized Systems. In: Meersman, R., Tari, Z., Herrero, P. (eds) On the Move to Meaningful Internet Systems 2006: OTM 2006 Workshops. OTM 2006. Lecture Notes in Computer Science, vol 4277. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/11915034_86
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/11915034_86
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