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Optimizing an Incentives’ Mechanism for Truthful Feedback in Virtual Communities

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Agents and Peer-to-Peer Computing (AP2PC 2005)

Part of the book series: Lecture Notes in Computer Science ((LNAI,volume 4118))

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Abstract

We analyze a mechanism that provides strong incentives for the submission of truthful feedback in virtual communities where services are exchanged on a peer-to-peer basis. Lying peers are punished with a severity that is exponential to their frequency of lying. We had first introduced and evaluated experimentally the mechanism in [1]. In this paper, we develop a Markov-chain model of the mechanism. Based on this, we prove that, when the mechanism is employed, the system evolves to a beneficial steady-state operation even in the case of a dynamically renewed population. Furthermore, we develop a procedure for the efficient selection of the parameters of the mechanism for any peer-to-peer system; this procedure is based on ergodic arguments. Simulation experiments reveal that the procedure is indeed accurate, as well as effective regarding the incentives provided to participants for submitting truthful feedback.

The present work was partly funded by the IST project EuroNGI (IST-2003-507613).

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© 2006 Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg

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Papaioannou, T.G., Stamoulis, G.D. (2006). Optimizing an Incentives’ Mechanism for Truthful Feedback in Virtual Communities. In: Despotovic, Z., Joseph, S., Sartori, C. (eds) Agents and Peer-to-Peer Computing. AP2PC 2005. Lecture Notes in Computer Science(), vol 4118. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/11925941_1

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/11925941_1

  • Publisher Name: Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg

  • Print ISBN: 978-3-540-49025-8

  • Online ISBN: 978-3-540-68967-6

  • eBook Packages: Computer ScienceComputer Science (R0)

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