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Extended Sanitizable Signatures

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Part of the book series: Lecture Notes in Computer Science ((LNSC,volume 4296))

Abstract

Sanitizable signatures introduced by Ateniese et al. is a powerful and fairly practical tool that enables an authorised party called the censor to modify designated parts of a signed message in an arbitrary way without interacting with the signer. In our paper we present several extensions of this paradigm that make sanitizable signatures even more useful. First of all we show how to limit the censor’s abilities to modify mutable parts of a signed message to a predetermined set of strings. In our next proposal we show how to construct a scheme wherein the censor can insert an arbitrary string into a document, but this must be the same string in all designated places. We also present a construction based on a sanitizable signature that allows the censor to present only a constant number of versions of the sanitized message. Another extension provides so-called strong transparency. In this case the verifier does not know which parts of the message could have been modified. Finally, we point out new applications of sanitizable signatures based on combining them with time released cryptography techniques.

Partially supported by KBN grants 0 T00A 003 23 (years 2003–2005) and 3T11C 011 26 (year 2006).

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Klonowski, M., Lauks, A. (2006). Extended Sanitizable Signatures. In: Rhee, M.S., Lee, B. (eds) Information Security and Cryptology – ICISC 2006. ICISC 2006. Lecture Notes in Computer Science, vol 4296. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/11927587_28

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/11927587_28

  • Publisher Name: Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg

  • Print ISBN: 978-3-540-49112-5

  • Online ISBN: 978-3-540-49114-9

  • eBook Packages: Computer ScienceComputer Science (R0)

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