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Efficient Augmented Password-Based Encrypted Key Exchange Protocol

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Mobile Ad-hoc and Sensor Networks (MSN 2006)

Part of the book series: Lecture Notes in Computer Science ((LNCCN,volume 4325))

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Abstract

In this paper, we propose an efficient augmented password-based encrypted key exchange protocol based on that of Bellovin and Merritt. The protocol is more efficient than any of the existing augmented encrypted key exchange protocols in the literature we can document and thus is popular in low resource environments. Furthermore, we have proved its security under the assumptions that the hash function closely behaves like a random oracle and that the computational Diffie-Hellman problem is difficult.

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Wu, S., Zhu, Y. (2006). Efficient Augmented Password-Based Encrypted Key Exchange Protocol. In: Cao, J., Stojmenovic, I., Jia, X., Das, S.K. (eds) Mobile Ad-hoc and Sensor Networks. MSN 2006. Lecture Notes in Computer Science, vol 4325. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/11943952_45

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/11943952_45

  • Publisher Name: Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg

  • Print ISBN: 978-3-540-49932-9

  • Online ISBN: 978-3-540-49933-6

  • eBook Packages: Computer ScienceComputer Science (R0)

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