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Entwurf von kombinatorischen Auktionen für Allokations- und Beschaffungsprozesse

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Herausforderungen in der Wirtschaftsinformatik

Abstract

Durch den Einsatz von kombinatorischen Auktionen können Allokations- und Beschaffungsprozesse unter Berücksichtigung von Gütersubstitutionalitäten und Komplementaritäten effizient abgewickelt werden. Der Beitrag beschreibt Kriterien für Analyse, Entwurf und Modellierung von web-basierten kombinatorischen Beschaffungs- und Allokationssystemen. Zunächst werden die Grundlagen von kombinatorischen Auktionen erläutert und unterschiedliche Varia nten dieses Verfahrens dargestellt. Da den Vorteilen der kombinatorischen Auktion (allokative Effizienz, Transaktionskostenreduktion und Fairness) eine Reihe von Nutzungshindernissen beispielsweise in Form hoher Entwurfs- und Nutzungskomplexität gegenüberstehen, werden in einem weiteren Abschnitt Maßnahmen zur Vereinfachung von kombinatorischen Auktionsverfahren diskutiert. Im zweiten Teil dieser Abhandlung wird die ökonomische Bedeutung von kombinatorischen Auktionen anhand einer Reihe von Einsatzgebieten aufgezeigt. Darauf aufbauend folgt ein kurzer Überblick über Auktionssysteme, welche für die web-gestützte Durchführung von kombinatorischen Allokations- und Beschaffungsprozessen geeignet sind. Basierend auf den in vorausgehenden Abschnitten gewonnenen Erkenntnissen wird im dritten Teil des Beitrags ein umfassender Entscheidungsrahmen für den Entwurf von anwendungsorientierten kombinatorischen Auktionen entwickelt. Auktionsentwürfe, die innerhalb dieses Entscheidungsrahmens erstellt wurden, müssen vor ihrem Praxiseinsatz auf ihre ökonomische Validität überprüft werden. Der Beitrag schließt daher mit dem Vorschlag für ein Vorgehensmodell zur experimentellen und simulativen Überprüfung der Auktionsentwürfe.

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König, W., Schwind, M. (2006). Entwurf von kombinatorischen Auktionen für Allokations- und Beschaffungsprozesse. In: Herausforderungen in der Wirtschaftsinformatik. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/3-540-28907-0_3

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/3-540-28907-0_3

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