Summary
The paper is divided into three parts: In section 29.1 of the paper, Generalized Game Theory (GGT) is outlined, and its applications in formalizing key social science concepts such as institutions, social relationships, roles, judgment, and games are presented. Institutions operate as a type of social algorithm, organizing and regulating agents playing different roles as they engage in deliberation and judgment activities and make and implement collective decisions. Section 29.2 of the paper will present simple multi-agent simulation models and selected results of the simulation. Section 29.3 will briefly outline an agenda for societal research based on the application of GGT to explaining and managing problems of insecurity and social disorder in multi-agent systems. In the GGT perspective, the problem of security can be formulated in terms of regulating a system and its agents, and dealing with social disorder and crisis.
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Burns, T.R., Caldas, J.C., Roszkowska, E. (2005). Generalized Game Theory’s Contribution to Multi-agent Modelling. In: Monitoring, Security, and Rescue Techniques in Multiagent Systems. Advances in Soft Computing, vol 28. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/3-540-32370-8_29
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/3-540-32370-8_29
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