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Aggregate Game and International Fishery with Several Countries

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Operations Research Proceedings 2005

Part of the book series: Operations Research Proceedings ((ORP,volume 2005))

3. Conclusion

In this paper we have been able to derive the closed loop solution for international fishery with several countries engaged in fishing to maximize their total discounted utilities over finite fishing periods. Our international fishery model is a generalized version of the well known model of international fish war between two countries. Recognizing that at each stage of maximization, the equilibrium conditions are those of aggregate games, we have derived rather easily the optimal harvesting rates for the first period for any length of harvesting periods, which enables us to determine the optimal harvesting rates for all subsequent periods.

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References

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© 2006 Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg

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Okuguchi, K. (2006). Aggregate Game and International Fishery with Several Countries. In: Haasis, HD., Kopfer, H., Schönberger, J. (eds) Operations Research Proceedings 2005. Operations Research Proceedings, vol 2005. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg . https://doi.org/10.1007/3-540-32539-5_72

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