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Dominance and Equilibria in the Path Player Game

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Operations Research Proceedings 2005

Part of the book series: Operations Research Proceedings ((ORP,volume 2005))

Summary

This paper investigates the relation between Nash equilibria and non-dominated solutions in a special class of games, namely path player games. Nash equilibria are situations in a game where none of the players is able to obtain a better outcome by himself. On the other hand, a situation is non-dominated if there does not exist a situation which is really better for one of the players, and at least the same for all others. We provide two classes of path player games in which each non-dominated situation is a Nash equilibrium, and one class in which also the reverse is true.

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© 2006 Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg

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Schöbel, A., Schwarze, S. (2006). Dominance and Equilibria in the Path Player Game. In: Haasis, HD., Kopfer, H., Schönberger, J. (eds) Operations Research Proceedings 2005. Operations Research Proceedings, vol 2005. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg . https://doi.org/10.1007/3-540-32539-5_77

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