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An Extended Alternating-Offers Bargaining Protocol for Automated Negotiation in Multi-agent Systems

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On the Move to Meaningful Internet Systems 2002: CoopIS, DOA, and ODBASE (OTM 2002)

Part of the book series: Lecture Notes in Computer Science ((LNCS,volume 2519))

Abstract

This paper focuses on the study of bilateral bargaining protocol for competitive agents within the context of automated negotiation. Some modifications are proposed to improve the classical alternating-offers bargaining model and corresponding experimentation is designed to study the advantages/ disadvantages of this modified bargaining.

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Author information

Authors and Affiliations

  1. Dept. of Computer Science, University of Saskatchewan, SK, S7N 1L7, Saskatoon, Canada

    Pinata Winoto, Gordon McCalla & Julita Vassileva

Authors
  1. Pinata Winoto
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  2. Gordon McCalla
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  3. Julita Vassileva
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Editor information

Editors and Affiliations

  1. DOA Institute, p/a Leeuwlantstraat 83, 2100, Antwerp, Belgium

    Robert Meersman

  2. RMIT University School of Computer Science and IT, GPO Box 2476V, VIC 3001, Melbourne, Australia

    Zahir Tari

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© 2002 Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg

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Winoto, P., McCalla, G., Vassileva, J. (2002). An Extended Alternating-Offers Bargaining Protocol for Automated Negotiation in Multi-agent Systems. In: Meersman, R., Tari, Z. (eds) On the Move to Meaningful Internet Systems 2002: CoopIS, DOA, and ODBASE. OTM 2002. Lecture Notes in Computer Science, vol 2519. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/3-540-36124-3_11

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/3-540-36124-3_11

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  • Publisher Name: Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg

  • Print ISBN: 978-3-540-00106-5

  • Online ISBN: 978-3-540-36124-4

  • eBook Packages: Springer Book Archive

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