Abstract
This paper focuses on the study of bilateral bargaining protocol for competitive agents within the context of automated negotiation. Some modifications are proposed to improve the classical alternating-offers bargaining model and corresponding experimentation is designed to study the advantages/ disadvantages of this modified bargaining.
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Winoto, P., McCalla, G., Vassileva, J. (2002). An Extended Alternating-Offers Bargaining Protocol for Automated Negotiation in Multi-agent Systems. In: Meersman, R., Tari, Z. (eds) On the Move to Meaningful Internet Systems 2002: CoopIS, DOA, and ODBASE. OTM 2002. Lecture Notes in Computer Science, vol 2519. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/3-540-36124-3_11
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/3-540-36124-3_11
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