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Robust Key-Evolving Public Key Encryption Schemes

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Information and Communications Security (ICICS 2002)

Part of the book series: Lecture Notes in Computer Science ((LNCS,volume 2513))

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Abstract

We propose a key-evolving paradigm to deal with the key exposure problem of public key encryption schemes. The key evolving paradigm is like the one used for forward-secure digital signature schemes. Let time be divided into time periods such that at time period j, the decryptor holds the secret key SK j , while the public key PK is fixed during its lifetime. At time period j, a sender encrypts a message m as 〈j,c〉, which can be decrypted only with the private key SK j . When the time makes a transit from period j to j + 1, the decryptor updates its private key from SK j to SK j+1 and deletes SK j immediately. The key-evolving paradigm assures that compromise of the private key SK j does not jeopardize the message encrypted at the other time periods. We propose two key-evolving public key encryption schemes with z-resilience such that compromise of z private keys does not affect confidentiality of messages encrypted in other time periods. Assuming that the DDH problem is hard, we show one scheme semantically secure against passive adversaries and the other scheme semantically secure against the adaptive chosen ciphertext attack under the random oracle.

Research supported in part by the National Science Council grant NSC-90-2213-E-009-152 and by the Ministry of Education grant 90-E-FA04-1-4, Taiwan, ROC.

A preliminary verison appeared in the ePrint 2001/009 (February, 2001) of IACR (http://eprint.iacr.org).

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Author information

Authors and Affiliations

  1. Department of Computer and Information Science, National Chiao Tung University, Hsinchu, Taiwan, 30050

    Wen-Guey Tzeng & Zhi-Jia Tzeng

Authors
  1. Wen-Guey Tzeng
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  2. Zhi-Jia Tzeng
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Editor information

Editors and Affiliations

  1. Labs for Information Technology, 21 Heng Mui Keng Terrace, Singapore, 119613

    Robert Deng , Feng Bao  & Jianying Zhou ,  & 

  2. Engineering Research Center for Information Security Technology, Chinese Academy of Sciences, P.O. Box 8718, Beijing, 100080, China

    Sihan Qing

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© 2002 Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg

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Tzeng, WG., Tzeng, ZJ. (2002). Robust Key-Evolving Public Key Encryption Schemes. In: Deng, R., Bao, F., Zhou, J., Qing, S. (eds) Information and Communications Security. ICICS 2002. Lecture Notes in Computer Science, vol 2513. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/3-540-36159-6_6

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/3-540-36159-6_6

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  • Publisher Name: Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg

  • Print ISBN: 978-3-540-00164-5

  • Online ISBN: 978-3-540-36159-6

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