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Hardness Results for Multicast Cost Sharing

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FST TCS 2002: Foundations of Software Technology and Theoretical Computer Science (FSTTCS 2002)

Part of the book series: Lecture Notes in Computer Science ((LNCS,volume 2556))

Abstract

We continue the study of multicast cost sharing from the viewpoints of both computational complexity and economic mechanism design. We provide fundamental lower bounds on the network complexity of group-strategyproof, budget-balanced mechanisms. We also extend a classical impossibility result in game theory to show that no strategyproof mechanism can be both approximately efficient and approximately budget-balanced.

This work was supported by the DoD University Research Initiative (URI) program administered by the Office of Naval Research under Grant N00014-01-1-0795. A full version of this paper has been submitted for journal publication [4].

Supported in part by ONR grants N00014-01-1-0795 and N00014-01-1-0447 and NSF grants CCR-0105337, CCR-TC-0208972, ANI-0207399, and ITR-0219018.

Supported in part by NSF grants CCR-9985304, ANI-0207399, and CCR-0209122.

Supported by NSF Career grant CCR-9702980 and ONR grant N00014-01-1-0795.

Supported in part by NSF grants ANI-9730162, ITR-0081698, ITR-0121555, and ANI-0207399.

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Feigenbaum, J., Krishnamurthy, A., Sami, R., Shenker, S. (2002). Hardness Results for Multicast Cost Sharing. In: Agrawal, M., Seth, A. (eds) FST TCS 2002: Foundations of Software Technology and Theoretical Computer Science. FSTTCS 2002. Lecture Notes in Computer Science, vol 2556. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/3-540-36206-1_13

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/3-540-36206-1_13

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  • Print ISBN: 978-3-540-00225-3

  • Online ISBN: 978-3-540-36206-7

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