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Co-evolutionary Auction Mechanism Design: A Preliminary Report

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Agent-Mediated Electronic Commerce IV. Designing Mechanisms and Systems (AMEC 2002)

Part of the book series: Lecture Notes in Computer Science ((LNAI,volume 2531))

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Abstract

Auctions can be thought of as a method for resource allocation. The economic theory behind such systems is mechanism design. Traditionally, economists have approached design problems by studying the analytic or experimental properties of different mechanisms. An alternative is to view a mechanism as the outcome of some evolutionary process involving buyers, sellers and an auctioneer, and so automatically generate not just strategies for trading, but also strategies for auctioneering. As a first step in this alternative direction, we have applied genetic programming to the development of an auction pricing rule for double auctions in a wholesale electricity marketplace.

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Author information

Authors and Affiliations

  1. Department of Computer Science, University of Liverpool, Chadwick Building, L69 7ZF, Liverpool, UK

    Steve Phelps, Peter McBurney & Simon Parsons

  2. Center for Coordination Science, Sloan School of Management, M.I.T., 3 Cambridge Center, NE20-336, MA 02142, Cambridge, USA

    Simon Parsons

  3. Department of Computer and Information Science, Brooklyn College, 2900 Bedford Avenue, Brooklyn, NY 11210, New York, USA

    Simon Parsons

  4. Department of Computer Science, Columbia University, 1214 Amsterdam Avenue, Mailcode 0401, NY 10027, New York, USA

    Elizabeth Sklar

Authors
  1. Steve Phelps
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  2. Peter McBurney
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  3. Simon Parsons
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  4. Elizabeth Sklar
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Editor information

Editors and Affiliations

  1. University of Bath, Bath, UK

    Julian Padget

  2. IBM - Haifa Research Labs, Haifa University, Israel

    Onn Shehory

  3. Maxwell Dworkin Lab, Cambridge, MA, USA

    David Parkes

  4. Carnegie Mellon University, Pittsburgh, PA, USA

    Norman Sadeh

  5. IBM T.J. Watson Research Center, Harthorne, NY, USA

    William E. Walsh

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© 2002 Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg

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Phelps, S., McBurney, P., Parsons, S., Sklar, E. (2002). Co-evolutionary Auction Mechanism Design: A Preliminary Report. In: Padget, J., Shehory, O., Parkes, D., Sadeh, N., Walsh, W.E. (eds) Agent-Mediated Electronic Commerce IV. Designing Mechanisms and Systems. AMEC 2002. Lecture Notes in Computer Science(), vol 2531. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/3-540-36378-5_8

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/3-540-36378-5_8

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  • Publisher Name: Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg

  • Print ISBN: 978-3-540-00327-4

  • Online ISBN: 978-3-540-36378-1

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