Abstract
A variety of hazard analysis techniques have been proposed for software-based systems but individually the techniques are limited in their ability to cope with system complexity, or to derive and prioritise component safety requirements. There is also confusion in practice about whether the techniques are being used to assess risk or to assign targets. This paper proposes a way of integrating hazard analysis techniques to solve these problems. The resulting process enables functional safety requirements to be derived for logically complex components such as software, together with target (maximum acceptable) failure rates.
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Lindsay, P.A., McDermid, J.A., Tombs, D.J. (2000). Deriving Quantified Safety Requirements in Complex Systems. In: Koornneef, F., van der Meulen, M. (eds) Computer Safety, Reliability and Security. SAFECOMP 2000. Lecture Notes in Computer Science, vol 1943. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/3-540-40891-6_11
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/3-540-40891-6_11
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