Abstract
We present a sealed-bid electronic auction scheme that is equitably fair for the bidders and the seller. In this scheme, the interests of both the bidders and the seller are safeguarded: the identity of the non-winning bidders and their bidding behavior are protected (anonymity), and the bidders cannot withdraw their bids without being detected (non-repudiation). The scheme fulfills the requirements of a secure auction scheme and is verifiable. It extends the Stubblebine & Syverson auction scheme that is not equitably fair (it does not prevent bid withdrawals). Our scheme employs a Registrar and an Auctioneer for which no special trust assumptions are made.
Research Supported by the Secreatariat of Research and Technology of Greece
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Magkos, E., Burmester, M., Chrissikopoulos, V. (2000). An Equitably Fair On-line Auction Scheme. In: Bauknecht, K., Madria, S.K., Pernul, G. (eds) Electronic Commerce and Web Technologies. EC-Web 2000. Lecture Notes in Computer Science, vol 1875. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/3-540-44463-7_7
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/3-540-44463-7_7
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