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Tolerating Generalized Mobile Adversaries in Secure Multiparty Computation

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Progress in Cryptology —INDOCRYPT 2000 (INDOCRYPT 2000)

Part of the book series: Lecture Notes in Computer Science ((LNCS,volume 1977))

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Abstract

We study a distributed adversarial model of computation in which the faults are non-stationary and can move through the network (like viruses) as well as non-threshold (there is no specific bound on the number of corrupted players at any given time). We show how to construct multiparty protocols that are perfectly secure against such generalized mobile adversaries. The key element in our solution is devising non-threshold proactive verifiable secret sharing schemes that generalize the secret sharing schemes known in the literature.

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Srinathan, K., Pandu Rangan, C. (2000). Tolerating Generalized Mobile Adversaries in Secure Multiparty Computation. In: Roy, B., Okamoto, E. (eds) Progress in Cryptology —INDOCRYPT 2000. INDOCRYPT 2000. Lecture Notes in Computer Science, vol 1977. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/3-540-44495-5_12

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/3-540-44495-5_12

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  • Print ISBN: 978-3-540-41452-0

  • Online ISBN: 978-3-540-44495-4

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