Abstract
While there is a great deal of sophistication in modern cryptology, simple (and simplistic) explanations of cryptography remain useful and perhaps necessary. Many of the explanations are informal; others are embodied in formal methods, particularly in formal methods for the analysis of security protocols. This note (intended to accompany a talk at the Crypto 2000 conference) describes some of those explanations. It focuses on simple models of attacks, pointing to partial justifications of these models.
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Abadi, M. (2000). Taming the Adversary. In: Bellare, M. (eds) Advances in Cryptology — CRYPTO 2000. CRYPTO 2000. Lecture Notes in Computer Science, vol 1880. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/3-540-44598-6_22
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