Abstract
We introduce the νSPI-calculus that strengthens the notion of “perfect symmetric cryptography” of the spi-calculus by taking time into account. This involves defining an operational semantics, defining a control flow analysis (CFA) in the form of a flow logic, and proving semantic correctness. Our first result is that secrecy in the sense of Dolev-Yao can be expressed in terms of the CFA. Our second result is that also non-interference in the sense of Abadi can be expressed in terms of the CFA; unlike Abadi we find the non-interference property to be an extension of the Dolev-Yao property.
The first two authors have been partially supported by the Progetti MURST TOSCA and AI, TS & CFA.
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Bodei, C., Degano, P., Nielson, F., Nielson, H.R. (2001). Static Analysis for Secrecy and Non-interference in Networks of Processes. In: Malyshkin, V. (eds) Parallel Computing Technologies. PaCT 2001. Lecture Notes in Computer Science, vol 2127. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/3-540-44743-1_3
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/3-540-44743-1_3
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