Abstract
The use of cryptographic system to provide the privacy of transmitted message over network is increasing gradually. A key agreement protocol is the most important part to establish a secure cryptographic system and the effort to standardize the key agreement protocols is in rapid progress. In this paper, we study properties and operation of standard key agreement protocols and analyze the security of their protocols under several active attacker models such as active impersonation, key-compromised impersonation, (full/half ) forward secrecy, known-key passive attack, known-key impersonation attack and so on. Then, we suggest the standard for selecting key agreement protocols for each application, and find the most suitable key agreement protocol for each application.
Research supported by the KISA (Korea Information Security Agency) under project 2001-S-092.
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Oh, S., Kwak, J., Lee, S., Won, D. (2003). Security Analysis and Applications of Standard Key Agreement Protocols. In: Kumar, V., Gavrilova, M.L., Tan, C.J.K., L’Ecuyer, P. (eds) Computational Science and Its Applications — ICCSA 2003. ICCSA 2003. Lecture Notes in Computer Science, vol 2668. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/3-540-44843-8_21
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/3-540-44843-8_21
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