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Computer-Assisted Verification of a Protocol for Certified Email

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Static Analysis (SAS 2003)

Part of the book series: Lecture Notes in Computer Science ((LNCS,volume 2694))

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Abstract

We present the formalization and verification of a recent cryptographic protocol for certified email. Relying on a tool for automatic protocol analysis, we establish the key security properties of the protocol. This case study explores the use of general correspondence assertions in automatic proofs, and aims to demonstrate the considerable power of the tool and its applicability to non-trivial, interesting protocols.

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Author information

Authors and Affiliations

  1. Computer Science Department, University of California, Santa Cruz

    Martín Abadi

  2. Département d’Informatique, École Normale Supérieure, Paris and Max-Planck-Institut für Informatik, Saarbrücken

    Bruno Blanchet

Authors
  1. Martín Abadi
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  2. Bruno Blanchet
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Editor information

Editors and Affiliations

  1. École Polytechnique, STIX, 91128, Palaiseau cedex, France

    Radhia Cousot

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© 2003 Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg

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Abadi, M., Blanchet, B. (2003). Computer-Assisted Verification of a Protocol for Certified Email. In: Cousot, R. (eds) Static Analysis. SAS 2003. Lecture Notes in Computer Science, vol 2694. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/3-540-44898-5_17

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/3-540-44898-5_17

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  • Publisher Name: Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg

  • Print ISBN: 978-3-540-40325-8

  • Online ISBN: 978-3-540-44898-3

  • eBook Packages: Springer Book Archive

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