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Analysis of Norms Game with Mutual Choice

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New Frontiers in Artificial Intelligence (JSAI 2001)

Part of the book series: Lecture Notes in Computer Science ((LNAI,volume 2253))

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Abstract

In this paper, our purpose is to represent the establishment of the norm as the indirect sanction of mutual choice that individuals have the rights to refuse interaction. We introduce a mutual choice mechanism in the norms game [20.2], [20.8] instead of a direct penal regulation and then reformulate the norms and metanorms games with mutual choice. As a result, through an agent-based simulation, we conform that the metanorm for mutual choice supports the establishment of the norm.

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© 2001 Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg

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Yamashita, T., Kawamura, H., Yamamoto, M., Ohuchi, A. (2001). Analysis of Norms Game with Mutual Choice. In: Terano, T., Ohsawa, Y., Nishida, T., Namatame, A., Tsumoto, S., Washio, T. (eds) New Frontiers in Artificial Intelligence. JSAI 2001. Lecture Notes in Computer Science(), vol 2253. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/3-540-45548-5_20

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/3-540-45548-5_20

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  • Publisher Name: Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg

  • Print ISBN: 978-3-540-43070-4

  • Online ISBN: 978-3-540-45548-6

  • eBook Packages: Springer Book Archive

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