Abstract
We consider the free-rider problem in peer-to-peer file sharing networks such as Napster: that individual users are provided with no incentive for adding value to the network. We examine the design implications of the assumption that users will selfishly act to maximize their own rewards, by constructing a formal game theoretic model of the system and analyzing equilibria of user strategies under several novel payment mechanisms. We support and extend this workwith results from experiments with a multi-agent reinforcement learning model.
Supported by Stanford Graduate Fellowship
Supported by nsf contract #CCR-9732754
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Golle, P., Leyton-Brown, K., Mironov, I., Lillibridge, M. (2001). Incentives for Sharing in Peer-to-Peer Networks. In: Fiege, L., Mühl, G., Wilhelm, U. (eds) Electronic Commerce. WELCOM 2001. Lecture Notes in Computer Science, vol 2232. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/3-540-45598-1_9
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/3-540-45598-1_9
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