Skip to main content
SpringerLink
Log in

Incentives for Sharing in Peer-to-Peer Networks

  • Conference paper
  • First Online:
Electronic Commerce (WELCOM 2001)

Part of the book series: Lecture Notes in Computer Science ((LNCS,volume 2232))

Included in the following conference series:

Abstract

We consider the free-rider problem in peer-to-peer file sharing networks such as Napster: that individual users are provided with no incentive for adding value to the network. We examine the design implications of the assumption that users will selfishly act to maximize their own rewards, by constructing a formal game theoretic model of the system and analyzing equilibria of user strategies under several novel payment mechanisms. We support and extend this workwith results from experiments with a multi-agent reinforcement learning model.

Supported by Stanford Graduate Fellowship

Supported by nsf contract #CCR-9732754

This is a preview of subscription content, log in via an institution to check access.

Access this chapter

Log in via an institution
Chapter
USD 29.95
Price excludes VAT (USA)
  • Available as PDF
  • Read on any device
  • Instant download
  • Own it forever
eBook
USD 39.99
Price excludes VAT (USA)
  • Available as PDF
  • Read on any device
  • Instant download
  • Own it forever
Softcover Book
USD 54.99
Price excludes VAT (USA)
  • Compact, lightweight edition
  • Dispatched in 3 to 5 business days
  • Free shipping worldwide - see info

Tax calculation will be finalised at checkout

Purchases are for personal use only

Institutional subscriptions

Preview

Unable to display preview. Download preview PDF.

Unable to display preview. Download preview PDF.

References

  1. E. Adar and B. Huberman. Free riding on Gnutella. First Monday, 5(10), 2000.

    Google Scholar 

  2. N. Asokan. Fairness in Electronic Commerce. PhD thesis, University of Waterloo, Ontario, Canada, 1998.

    Google Scholar 

  3. D. Fudenberg and D. Levine. The Theory of Learning in Games. MIT Press, 1998.

    Google Scholar 

  4. D. Fudenberg and J. Tirole. Game Theory. MIT Press, 1991.

    Google Scholar 

  5. C. Grayson. Decisions Under Uncertainty: Drilling Decisions by Oil & Gas Operators. Ayer Company, 1979.

    Google Scholar 

  6. B. Macq, editor. Special Issue on Identification and Protection of Multimedia Information, volume 87(7), July 1999.

    Google Scholar 

    Google Scholar 

  7. G. Marwell and R. Ames. Experiments in the provision of public goods: I. resources, interest, group size, and the free-rider problem. American J. of Sociology, 84, 1979.

    Google Scholar 

  8. A. M. Odlyzko. The history of communications and its implications for the Internet, 2000. Available online at http://www.research.att.com/~amo.

  9. M. J. Osborne and A. Rubinstein. A Course in Game Theory. MIT Press, 1994.

    Google Scholar 

  10. S. Saroiu, P. Gummadi, and S. Gribble. Measurement study of peer-to-peer file sharing systems. Tech Report UW-CSE-01-06-02, University of Washington, 2001.

    Google Scholar 

  11. J. Sweeny. An experimental investigation of the free-rider problem. Social Science Research, 2, 1973.

    Google Scholar 

  12. B. Thorn and T. Connolly. Discretionary data bases. Comm. Research, 14(5), October 1987.

    Google Scholar 

Download references

Author information

Authors and Affiliations

  1. Computer Science Department, Stanford University, USA

    Philippe Golle, Kevin Leyton-Brown & Ilya Mironov

  2. Systems Research Center, Compaq Computer Corporation, USA

    Mark Lillibridge

Authors
  1. Philippe Golle
    View author publications

    You can also search for this author in PubMed Google Scholar

  2. Kevin Leyton-Brown
    View author publications

    You can also search for this author in PubMed Google Scholar

  3. Ilya Mironov
    View author publications

    You can also search for this author in PubMed Google Scholar

  4. Mark Lillibridge
    View author publications

    You can also search for this author in PubMed Google Scholar

Editor information

Editors and Affiliations

  1. Darmstadt University of Technology, Wilhelminenstr.7, 64283, Darmstadt, Germany

    Ludger Fiege  & Gero Mühl  & 

  2. T-Nova, Otto-Röhm-Str.71C, 64293, Darmstadt, Germany

    Uwe Wilhelm

Rights and permissions

Reprints and permissions

Copyright information

© 2001 Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg

About this paper

Cite this paper

Golle, P., Leyton-Brown, K., Mironov, I., Lillibridge, M. (2001). Incentives for Sharing in Peer-to-Peer Networks. In: Fiege, L., Mühl, G., Wilhelm, U. (eds) Electronic Commerce. WELCOM 2001. Lecture Notes in Computer Science, vol 2232. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/3-540-45598-1_9

Download citation

  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/3-540-45598-1_9

  • Published:

  • Publisher Name: Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg

  • Print ISBN: 978-3-540-42878-7

  • Online ISBN: 978-3-540-45598-1

  • eBook Packages: Springer Book Archive

Publish with us

Policies and ethics

Search

Navigation