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Types for Cryptographic Protocols

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CONCUR 2002 — Concurrency Theory (CONCUR 2002)

Part of the book series: Lecture Notes in Computer Science ((LNCS,volume 2421))

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Abstract

One of the many different approaches to proving properties of a cryptographic security protocol is to encode it within a process calculus [6],[7],[11],[12],[14],[20], and then to apply standard techniques from concurrency theory such as modelchecking [19] or equational reasoning [4],[5],[8],[9],[13],[15]. A promising recent development is to verify properties such as secrecy and authenticity via behavioural type systems [1],[2],[3],[10],[16],[17],[18]. This tutorial reviews the known type systems and results in this area, and suggests areas for further research.

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Authors and Affiliations

  1. Microsoft Research, USA

    Andrew D. Gordon

Authors
  1. Andrew D. Gordon
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Editor information

Editors and Affiliations

  1. Faculty of Informatics, Masaryk University Brno, Botanicka 68a, 60200, Brno, Czech Republic

    Luboš Brim , Mojmír Křetínský  & Antonín Kučera ,  & 

  2. Faculty of Electrical Engineering and Informatics, Department of Computer Science, Technical University of Ostrava (VSB), 17. listopadu 15, 70833, Ostrava-Poruba, Czech Republic

    Petr Jančar

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© 2002 Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg

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Gordon, A.D. (2002). Types for Cryptographic Protocols. In: Brim, L., Křetínský, M., Kučera, A., Jančar, P. (eds) CONCUR 2002 — Concurrency Theory. CONCUR 2002. Lecture Notes in Computer Science, vol 2421. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/3-540-45694-5_7

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/3-540-45694-5_7

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  • Publisher Name: Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg

  • Print ISBN: 978-3-540-44043-7

  • Online ISBN: 978-3-540-45694-0

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